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NOTES AND COMMENT

Standards of living conditions, concluded the Court, affect a person's
job efficiency, but do not make living expenses and means of residence
conditions of employment. A contrary holding would mean all employees, whether in company houses or not would be able to bargain for
living quarters.
Notwithstanding the factual differences between the Bemis Bag case
and those that have gone before, it is submitted that the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals reached the wrong decision. As to the fact that only
thirty-five percent of the employees were involved, the court failed
to realize that the duty to bargain collectively is for the protection of
minority groups as well as the majority and that smallness of number
affected is not a factor.3 4 Nor does the fact that housing was available
in a nearby town at rents comparable to those in the mill village justify
the holding that the latter were not bargainable. The issue was a rent
increase, amounting in effect to a wage cut for the tenants of company
houses. Living in the town meant transportation costs. Eighty applicants stood ready to fill the next vacancy in a 300 unit mill village.
In the light of the advantages to the employer, of company housing,3 5
it does not seem improper to conclude that company houses are "necessary and essential components in the furtherance of the enterprise," as
distinguished from a wholly personal, off-hour facility.
LACY

H.

THORNBURG

Pleading and Procedure-Counterclaims Exceeding the Jurisdictional
Limit of the Court-Remedies
A potentially troublesome problem is illustrated by the following
hypothetical case: Automobiles belonging respectively to A and B are
involved in a collision. The automobile of A sustains damage in the
amount of $50.00 and the automobile of B in the amount of $500.00.
Before B can institute suit in the superior court to recover his damages, A sues B before a Justice of the Peace to recover damages in
the amount of $50.00.1
Does B have to seek recovery of damages sustained by his automobile by entering a counterclaim2 to A's cause of action at the risk of
"Weyerhaeuser Timber Co., 87 N. L. R. B. 672 (1949) ; Steele v. Louisville
and Nashville Railroad Co., 323 U. S. 192 (1944).

" Notes 4 and 5 supra.

'Justices of the Peace have concurrent jurisdiction with the superior court
of civil actions in tort when the amount in controversy does not exceed fifty
dollars. N. C. GEN. STAT. § 7-122 (1953).
2 Counterclaim is used herein to mean a claim of the defendant in which an
affirmative judgment against the plaintiff is prayed for. Generally the scope of
this comment is limited to those counterclaims that exceed the plaintiff's claim.
For distinctions and definitions in the area of counterclaims, recoupments and
set-offs see: MCINTOSH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN CIVIL
CASES

§ 463 (1929).
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losing his right to recovery if he does not? If so is his claim limited
to $50.00? If he does not counterclaim will the decision of the Justice
bar his subsequent independent action even if it is not adverse to him
or inconsistent with his claim? Can he bring an independent suit while
A's cause is still pending? If not, what if the statute of limitations
bars his claim? If he can bring an independent action while the first
action is still pending, what if the first action finally determines that his
negligence was the proximate cause of the collision? Does he have
to litigate two suits in different courts at the same time? Is there any
way that he can have the whole controversy litigated in one action
and not have to diminish his own demands for relief? Does the code
provide a clear and adequate procedure by which the whole controversy may be adequately determined when the first claim is filed in
a justice's court, and the defendant has a claim arising out of the same
transaction that exceeds the jurisdiction of that court?
No clear answer to the foregoing questions is found in the North
Carolina law. North Carolina General Statute, § 1-13 53 provides
that in the superior court the answer of the defendant must contain
a statement of any new matter constituting a defense or counterclaim.
G. S. § 1-1374 states that a counterclaim must be a cause of action
arising out of, or connected with the same contract or transaction5
forming the basis of plaintiff's claim. The courts have construed
these acts generally to allow a defendant to counterclaim or not at
his option. 6 Such construction is in accord with decisions of other
jurisdictions in which similar or identical code provisions have been
construed. 7 The "must" in § 1-135 does not mean that the defendant
3
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-135 (1953).
'N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-137 (1935). "The counterclaim mentioned in this

article must be one existing in favor of a defendant and against a plaintiff between whom a several judgment might be had in the action, and arising out of
one of the following causes of action: (1). A cause of action arising out of the
contract or transaction set forth in the complaint as the foundation of the plaintiff's claim, or connected with the subject of the action. (2). In an action arising
on contract, any cause of action arising also on contract, and existing at the
commencement of the action." It is necessary to note that the second part of
this statute was not referred to in the discussion as it is not applicable to collisiontype counterclaims.
SAdverse claims arising out of the same collision clearly arise out of the
same transaction. McLean Trucking Co. v. Carolina Scenic Stages, 95 F. Supp.
437 (M. D. N. C. 1951) ; Todhunter v. Smith, 219 Cal. 690, 28 P. 2d 916 (1934);
Allen v. Salley, 179 N. C. 147, 101 S. E. 545 (1919).
0 Union Trust Co. v. McKinne, 179 N. C. 328, 102 S.E. 385 (1920)
(distinguishes Allen v. Salley, 179 N. C. 147, 101 S.E. 545 [1919]). Francis v. Edwards,
77 N. C. 271 (1877). See also Brandis, A Plea for Adoption by North Carolina
of the Federal JoinderRules, 25 N. C. L. REv. 245 (1947).
Note, 8 A. L. R. 694 (1920). There are many states with counterclaim provisions similar to those of North Carolina (see notes 3 and 4, supra) and also
a few with provisions identical to North Carolina's. Cf. N. D. Rxv. CODE § 280710 and § 28-0714 (1943) ; S. C. CODE § 10-652 and § 10-703 (1942) ; WASH.
REV. CODE § 4.32.080 and § 4.32.100 (1951).
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must plead his available counterclaim, but rather, if he does choose
to plead his available counterclaim he inust plead it in his answer.
Similarly, the rules of procedure of the Justice's courts state that a
counterclaim may be interposed.8 While the rules of procedure for
the Justice's courts are separate from those of the superior court they
must borrow from G. S. § 1-137 for effect and meaning.9 In Allen vu.
Salley,'0 and subsequent decisions," our court said that the claims of
both plaintiff and defendant in an automobile collision are a single
cause of action and must be settled in one action. There can be but
one judgment for the defendant or for the plaintiff. In such a situation,
12
the defendant is bound to counterclaim or his claim will be barred.
14
13
Although the rule as to collisions, and several other situations,
may not be consistent with the general rule it has been restated by
cases 15 and recognized by commentators' 6 so often that it cannot be
disregarded.
The weight of authority is to the effect that absent an express rule
or statute there cannot be a compulsory counterclaim.' 7 There may
be a bar to the defendant's claim, however, based on the ground that
the decision in the initial suit is inconsistent with the claims in the
second suit.1s Under the federal practice the defendant must counterclaim any cause which at the time of the service of the pleading, he
'N. C. GEN. STAT. § 7-149 rule 3 (1953).

' No definition of counterclaim is contained in N. C. GEN. STAT. § 7-149 rule 3
(1953) nor is there a definition within the rules of practice for justice's courts.
1" Allen v. Salley, 179 N. C. 147, 101 S.E. 545 (1919).
" Dwiggins v. Parkway Bus Co., Inc., 230 N. C. 234, 52 S.E. 2d 892 (1949);
Johnson v. Smith, 215 N. C. 322, 1 S.E. 2d 834 (1939).
12 Allen v. Salley, 179 N. C. 147, 101 S.E. 545 (1919).
13 See, Brandis, A Plea for Adoption by North Carolina of the Federal Joinder
Rules, 25 N. C. L. REv. 245 (1947).
1, See note 6 supra.
"'McLean Trucking Co. v. Carolina Scenic Stages, 95 F. Supp. 437
(M. D. N. C. 1951); Dwiggins v. Parkway Bus Co., Inc., 230 N. C. 234, 52
S.E. 2d 892 (1949); Johnson v. Smith, 215 N. C. 322, 1 S.E. 2d 834 (1949);
Allen v. Salley, 179 N. C. 147, 101 S.E. 545 (1919).
10 Note, 22 A. L. R. 2d 621 (1952).
Brandis, A Plea for Adoption by North
Carolina of the Federal Joinder Rules, 25 N. C. L. REv. 245 (1947). Note, 33
H~Av. L. REv. 857 (1920).
17

Note, 8 A. L. R. 694 (1920).

and illustration 1 (1942).

RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS

§ 58 comment b

For the result under an express compulsory counterclaim rule or statute compare RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 58 comment f (Supp.
1948), and Note 22 A. L. R. 2d 621 (1952).
" RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 58 comment d and illustration 9 (1942).
2
FREMAN, JUDGMENTS § 787 at page 1670 (5th ed. 1925). "The test of one's right
to recover in a second action, after having waived his cross-claim in the first,
is, Can all the facts necessary to support the judgment rendered against him exist
at the same time with the facts necessary to support the cross-claim sought to
be enforced in the second suit? For if, in order to recover in the first action,
the plaintiff must have shown the falsity of the allegations made by defendant
in the second suit, then the former judgment is a bar." This is on the theory
that a final judgment cannot be collaterally attacked. (The above, of course,
assumes no compulsory counterclaim situation.)
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has against the opposing party if it arises out of the same transaction
or occurrence. 19 Admittedly the Federal Rules apply only to the federal
district courts,20 which can render verdicts unlimited in amount. Nevertheless, it is, in a sense, a court of limited jurisdiction in that there is
a minimum amount required before jurisdiction attaches. 21 This limita-

tion does not apply to compulsory counterclaims, for they are treated
as ancillary to the plaintiff's claim and if the court has jurisdiction of
the plaintiff's claim it derives jurisdiction of the compulsory counterclaim. 22 It is interesting to note, however, that no state follows the
logic of the district courts by giving unlimited jurisdiction of counterclaims to Justices. 2 3 In North Carolina the limited jurisdiction is not
relaxed on appeal to the superior court,24 for on appeal, even though
the trial is de novo, 25 the jurisdiction is derivative and if the justice
did not have jurisdiction over the counterclaim neither does the superior
court. 26 Nor, in the superior court, can a remittitur of a counterclaim
in excess of the jurisdictional limit of the justice be effected 27 or a new
counterclaim in excess of the justice's jurisdictional amount be inter28
posed.
Several of the states have statutes or rules based on Federal Rule
13 (a) or of similar effect. 30 Generally these states have some clear
" FED. R. Civ. P. 13 (a).

20 See, FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
Generally, see: 28 U. S. C. A. § 1331 and § 1332 (1950).
"2Jurisdiction over a compulsory counterclaim is regarded as ancillary to the
plaintiff's claim. 3 Mooan, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 13.15 (1948). But see, 3 Mooa,
FEDEAnL PRACTICE f[ 13.19 (1948) (permissive counterclaims generally need independent jurisdictional amount).
2"24 R. C. L., Set-Off and Counterclaim, § 6 (1919) ; Duresen v. Blackman,
117 Minn. 206, 135 N.W. 530 (1912); Note, 37 L. R A. (N. S.) 606 (1912).
See also: Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Burger, 181 N. C. 241, 247, 107 S.E.
14, 17 (1921).
"It has been held with us in a number of instances that any
counterclaim, coming within the purview of the statute, regardless of its amount,
may be set up in a justice's court for the purpose of set-off and recoupment as
a bar or defense to the plaintiff's cause of action. But, of course, an affirmative
judgment could not be entered in this court unless it fell within the jurisdiction
of a justice of the peace."
"'If the justice did not have jurisdiction, then the superior court will have
none on appeal since the jurisdiction is derivative. Stacey Cheese Co. v. Pipkin,

2

155 N. C. 394, 71 S.E. 442 (1911).

McINTosH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND

PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES § 703 (4) p. 817 (1929). Note, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.)
606, 616 (1911).
'IN. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-299 (1953).
See note 20 mipra.
2 Perry v. Pulley, 206 N. C. 701, 175 S.E. 89 (1934).
" Perry v. Pulley, 206 N. C. 701, 175 S.E. 89 (1934).
2 Meneely v. Craven, 86 N. C. 364 (1882) (defendant not permitted to extend
amount demanded beyond the jurisdiction of the justice's court by amendment
in the superior court).
29
ARIZ. CODE ANN. § 21-437 (Supp. 1951) ; COLO. STAT. ANN. c. 2 rule 13 (a)

(Supp. 1952); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 52.11 (1) (1941); IowA CODE R. Civ. P.
rule 29 (1950); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 509.420 (Vernon 1949); N. M. STAT. ANN.
§ 19-101 (13) (a) (Supp. 1951); TEX. STAT., R. Civ. P. rule 97 (a) (Supp.
1948)
; UTAHI CODE ANN., R. Crv. P. rule 13 (a)
20

(1953).

Anx. STAT. ANN. § 27-1121 (4) (1947) ; CAL. CODE Civ. PRoC. § 439 (194'9);
IDAHo CODE ANN. § 5-614 (1947); NEV. ComP. LAWs § 8604 (1929). With the
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and definite provision for the problem posed in our hypothetical. There
are three approaches to the general problem: (1) The defendant does
not have to plead his counterclaim before the justice for the provisions
apply only to a court of unlimited original jurisdiction ;31 (2) The defendant does not have to plead his counterclaim if it exceeds the jurisdictional limit of the court ;32 or (3) The defendant must plead his
counterclaim, but he does not have to plead it in the justice's court
if he shows it will exceed in amount the court's jurisdiction. 3 3 Upon
tender of the counterclaim or certification that it will exceed the court's
jurisdiction as to amount the case is removed to a court of original
jurisdiction, unlimited as to amount, where it is tried as if it had
originated there. It does not appear that North Carolina has any such
clear-cut remedy. We do not seem to be in the first category because
our courts have not construed the requirement of counterclaiming as
a mandate of General Statute § 1-135, 3 or otherwise applicable only
to superior courts.3 5 Perhaps North Carolina is in the second category
since the justice does not have jurisdiction of a counterclaim in excess
of his jurisdictional limit.36 There is no statute to reply upon, however, and no decision directly in point. Likewise we have no statute
to put us clearly in the third category.
exception of Arkansas the above code sections are merely additions to sections
similar to the North Carolina provisions as to counterclaims, notes 3 and 4
supra. The California provision is typical: "If the defendant omits to set up
a counterclaim upon a cause arising out of the transaction set forth in the complaint as the foundation of the plaintiff's claim, neither he nor his assignee can
afterwards maintain an action against the plaintiff therefor."
The scope of this note does not include rules or statutes of very limited application. For instance: N. H. REV. LAws c. 391 § 14 and § 15 (1942) ; N. J. REv.
STAT. § 2:26-191 (1937); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 4977 and § 4978 (1949).
Similarly, MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 93-3408 (1947), which appears at first blush to
be like the California code, is not included for the counterclaim to which it refers
must be one that tends to diminish or defeat the plaintiff's claim (and is technically only a set-off). See note 2 supra.
"RAiz.
CODE ANN. § 21-201 (1939); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 26-401 (1947) (but
see, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-102 (1947)); NEV. Comp. LAWS § 8573 (1929);
N. M. STAT. ANN. 19-101 (1) (1941).
32 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 396 (1949);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 517.240 (Vernon
1949) ; TEx. STAT. R. Civ. P. rule 97 (a) (1948).
11 COLO. STAT. ANN. c. 2 rule 13 (1) (1935) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 52.12 (1951);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-1409 (1947) ; IOWA CODE ANN., R. Crv. P. rule 355 (1950);
UTAH CODE ANN., R. Civ. P. rule 13 (k) (1953).
2"It is essential to note that the North Carolina cases, as Allen v. Salley, 179
N. C. 147, 101 S.E. 545 (1919), do not construe the counterclaim statutes as
expressly requiring the defendant in an auto collision suit to counterclaim. The
rule, not being limited to the statute, is apparently not limited in application to
the superior courts. By way of comparison, Arkansas which has a counterclaim
statute which would not appear on its face to demand a counterclaim has construed the statute (applicable to their "superior court") to be a compulsory
counterclaim statute. In the cases so holding there is a great deal of reliance
placed on the legislative history of the act. Shrieves v. Yarborough, 220 Ark.
256, 247 S.W. 2d 193 (1952); Adams v. Henderson, 197 Ark. 907, 125 S.W. 2d
472 (1939); Morgan v. Rankin. 197 Ark. 119, 122 S.W. 2d 555 (1938) (all
three of these cases are auto collision suits.)
" See notes 15 and 16 supra.
" See notes 23 and 24 supra.
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Our Supreme Court will probably formulate a procedure applicable
to our hypothetical if it faces such a situation. If our court holds
that a defendant does not lose his right to sue on his claim by failure
to assert it in the first action, will the statutory defense of pendency
of a prior action between the same parties for the same cause be available to the plaintiff of the first action to dismiss the defendant's suit ?3
Such is the rule of Allen v. Salley,3 8 although in that case there was
no complication of the first court's not having jurisdiction to determine
the full amount of the defendant's claim. If the rule of Allen v. Salley
applies, then the defendant would have to await final adjudication of
the first suit before he could bring his action.39 If there were a judgment adverse to him, and also inconsistent with his claim then he would
be barred from bringing his claim by ordinary principles of res judicata.40 If there were not a judgment adverse to him he could bring
his independent action if the statute of limitations did not bar it. 41 Conversely, if the rule of Allen v. Salley was not applicable, the defendant
would have to litigate two actions, for if the first determined were adverse to him he would be barred in the second. 42 Of course, there
37N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-127 (3) (1953)
(grounds for demurrer) or N. C.

GEN. STAT. § 1-133 (1953) (provisions of § 1-127 available by answer when they
do not appear on the face of the complaint).
"Allen v. Salley, 179 N. C. 147, 101 S.E. 545 (1919). See also note 11 supra.
" See Note, 33 H~Av. L. REv. 857 (1920). It appears that generally the
second action is not dismissed because of pendency of a prior action between the
same parties for the same cause unless there is a compulsory counterclaim requirement. When the defendant has the option to counterclaim or not as he sees
fit, the fact that the parties are reversed in the second action is sufficient to disallow a dismissal. Conley v. Marshall, 304 Ky. 745, 202 S.W. 2d 382 (1947)
(collision: second action not dismissed) ; State ex rel. McHenry v. Cahoun,
87 Ohio App. 1, 93 N.E. 2d 317 (1950) (collision: second action in justice's
court not dismissable) ; Republic Automobile Ins. Co. v. Maedel, 253 Mich. 663,
235 N. W. 819 (1931) (collision: second action not dismissed). See notes 29
and 30 supra.
18RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 58 comment c and illustration 5 (1942). 2
FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 787 at page 1670 (5th ed. 1925).
Once the fact that
one party was guilty of negligence which was the proximate cause of the accident
has been finally adjudicated by a competent court it seems clear that the matter
cannot be collaterally attacked by contentions in another action concerning the
same transaction and between the same parties. Compare, RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 71 comment d (1942).
However, in RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 71
reviser's notes in comment d (Supp. 1948) this was formally retracted: "the
suggestion of the comment was that a court (of jurisdiction limited in amount)
does not have jurisdiction to consider a claim for a greater amount and, therefore, its adjudication of such a claim when set up by way of defense to a claim
within its jurisdiction should not be conclusive in a subsequent action between
the parties involving the larger claim. It appears that the great weight of
authority ... is to the contrary effect."
' See note 17 supra.
22 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 719 (5th ed. 1925). "Where two actions involving
the same issue or issues, between the same parties or their privies, are pending
at the same time, so that a final judgment in one would be res judicata or a bar
in the other, -when the judgment in one becomes final it may be urged in the
other by appropriate proceedings, regardless of which action was begun first.
It is the first final judgment, although it may be in the second suit, that renders
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might be a consolidation at the superior court level, but if in the second
action the question of whether the rule of Allen v. Salley applied were
appealed, before an adjudication of the merits, 43 the defendant would
find it difficult to restrain the first action until the second could be
decided on that point and remanded.
Perhaps our court might say, notwithstanding the fact that there
is no statute to such effect, that if the whole cause cannot be adequately
determined in the justice's court it is mandatory for the justice to remove it, and that the action should be removed to the superior court
where it should be tried as if it originated there.44 That seems the
only really satisfactory course to take unless the action in the justice's
court could be enjoined, by application to the superior court, in order
to have the whole controversy determined in one action. 45
Of the possible courses which could be allowed the defendant in
our hypothetical, it seems that the inadequacy of most of them and the
uncertainty of all of them demand a statute to prescribe an adequate
procedure for determining the whole controversy in one action. The
following statute is proposed as a much-needed addition to our code:
General Statute § 1-137 (a). Counterclaims Exceeding the
Juristiction of Courts of Jurisdiction Limited in Amount
-When a counterclaim arising out of the same contract or transaction forming the basis of plaintiff's claim40 is tendered, before
evidence is introduced, in a court of jurisdiction limited in
amount, and because of such limitation, the court does not have
the matter res judicata in the other suit . . . So where, pending an action for
damages begun by one party to a collision, against the other, the latter sues
the former in another court for damages arising from the same collision, and
obtains a judgment, while this judgment may not be pleaded in bar of the first
action, it may be urged as res judicata as to the issues adjudicated, such as the
negligence of one party and the other's freedom from negligence." See note 40
.mpra.
It appears from the
'' Allen v. Salley, 179 N. C. 147, 101 S.E. 545 (1919).
report of the case that the point went up on appeal to the supreme court before
there was an adjudication on the merits even though the decision of the superior
court was against dismissing the second action. Certainly if the trial court ruled
in favor of dismissing the second action there would be difficulty in restraining the
first action until the point could be determined and remanded. Also, of course,
there could be no consolidation unless the first and second actions were both in
the same county.
" Compare notes 23, 24, 26, 27, and 28 supra.
" Note, 125 A. L. R. 337 (1940). Otis v. Graham Paper Co., 188 Ga. 778,
4 S.E. 2d 824 (1939) (collision: permissive counterclaims: first action in a court
of jurisdiction limited in amount enjoined).
,.It is noted that the intent of the proposed statute is to allow removal of
counterclaims "arising out of the contract or transaction," which exceed the jurisdiction of the court, pleaded by the defendant. The reasons that "claims required to be pleaded in the first action" is not suggested as the criterion for
removal are: (1) The practical impossibility of foreseeing all situations to
which the court may apply the mandatory counterclaim rule; and (2) The
difficulties inherent in administering a rule so closely drawn.
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jurisdiction, the entire action shall be removed to the superior
court of the same county upon the filing by the counterclaiming
defendant of such bond as would be required for appeal to the
superior court if there were a verdict adverse to him for the full
amount of the claim by the plaintiff. The removal is mandatory
upon the filing of the bond and the superior court is to have
complete power to render any adequate verdict and judgment,.
regardless of amount.47
DANIEL

L.

BELL, JR.

Real Property-Easements-Implication from Description in Deed
The owner of a tract of land fronting on a city street conveyed out
of the tract two lots bordering on the street. One deed called for a
10-foot alley as the eastern boundary of the lot conveyed; the other
called for the alley as the western boundary. The owner later conveyed
a third lot in the rear, the deed to which described it as fronting on a
10-foot alley running from the street and between the two lots previously
conveyed. The plaintiffs, owners of the western front lot and rear
lot, brought an action to determine whether they have an easement in
the alley, since quitclaimed to defendants by heirs of the original
grantor. The North Carolina Supreme Court held that bare references
to the alley for descriptive purposes, being the only evidence of an
intent of the grantor to establish the easement, were insufficient standing
alone to create an easement by implication or otherwise.1
""The proposed statute treats the plaintiff as if he had obtained a favorable
judgment in the justice's court, and does not deprive him of any rights he has
under the present law. The only change is that a counterclaiming defendant
is now entitled to plead his claim in full provided he follows a defined procedure.
Neither does the statute deprive the justice's courts of jurisdiction in any
case. The effect of "exclusive original jurisdiction" in contract actions, where
the amount of the plaintiff's demand is less than $200.00, N. C. GEN. STAT. § 7-22
(1953), is unchanged: no superior court can acquire jurisdiction, except on appeal or removal from a justice. See also N. C. GEN. STAT. § 7-21 (1953) (concurrent jurisdiction with the superior court in other actions where amount claimed
is less than $50). See N. C. CoNsr. Art. IV, § 27 (as changed 1875) : "The
several Justices of the Peace shall have jurisdiction, under such regulations as
the General Assembly shall prescribe, of civil actions, founded on contract, wherein the sum demanded shall not exceed two hundred dollars (The Constitutional
Convention of 1875 changed "exclusive original jurisdiction" to "jurisdiction.")

... And the General Assembly may give to the justice of the Peace jurisdiction
of other civil actions wherein the value of the property in controversy does not
exceed fifty dollars . . . The party against whom the judgment is given may
appeal to the superior court from the same."
The reference to
1 Green v. Barbee, 238 N. C. 77, 76 S.E. 2d 307 (1953).
the alley in the deed to the plaintiffs' front lot was: "Beginning at a 10-foot
alley on . . . comer . . . thence in an east direction 105 feet to a stake on a 10foot alley to the beginning. . . ." The reference in the defendants' deed was:

" .west

210 feet to an alley; thence with the east side of said alley north

210 feet to
supra.

. . .

line...

"

Transcript of Record, pp. 17-18, Green v. Barbee,

